Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 103 | Issue 2

Article 4

Spring 2013

Compensation Statutes and Post-exoneration
Offending
Evan J. Mandery
Amy Shlosberg
Valerie West
Bennett Callaghan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Evan J. Mandery, Amy Shlosberg, Valerie West, and Bennett Callaghan, Compensation Statutes and Post-exoneration Offending, 103 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 553 (2013).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol103/iss2/4

This Criminology is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

0091-4169/13/10302-0553
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
Copy right © 2013 by Northwestern University School of Law

Vol. 103, No. 2
Printed in U.S.A.

CRIMINOLOGY
COMPENSATION STATUTES AND POSTEXONERATION OFFENDING
EVAN J. MANDERY*
AMY SHLOSBERG **
VALERIE WEST***
BENNETT CALLAGHAN ****
Utilizing a data set of exonerees compiled from the Center on
Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University, this study tracks the
behavior of 118 exonerees following their releases and examines the effects
of more than twenty variables on the exonerees’ post-release criminality.
We present here our findings on the effect of victim-compensation statutes
on post-exoneration offending. When treated as a dichotomous variable,
compensation has no apparent effect. When treated as a continuous
variable, however, a pattern emerges. Exonerees who are compensated
above a threshold amount of $500,000 commit offenses at a significantly
lower rate than those who are either not compensated or compensated
beneath the threshold. Prior critiques have called for more and better
compensation statutes on grounds of fairness. Needless to say, the fairness
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argument is substantial. This research suggests that the public policy
argument for compensation is compelling, too, and has the potential to
transform a stagnated debate.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the problem of wrongful convictions has come into focus in recent
years, increasing attention has been paid to government failures to
compensate adequately these victims of the criminal justice system. Only
twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have compensation
statutes in place. 1 Most of these states impose substantial barriers to
recovery. Furthermore, where compensation is paid, it is often trivial. The
academic community has widely condemned this state of affairs. 2 Most of
these critiques have called for more and better compensation statutes on
grounds of fairness. 3 Needless to say, the fairness argument is substantial.
Our focus, however, is on the heretofore unexamined utility of wrongful
conviction statutes. Are they useful as a crime-prevention tool?
This question has not been investigated previously. This oversight is
almost certainly attributable to the practical problems of studying this
population. The universe of people who have been convicted and later
absolved of a crime is small, and those who receive compensation comprise
a small subset of that group. Logistical challenges notwithstanding, the
question begs for research. Research on prison releasees suggests that
exonerees are potentially at high risk for offending following their releases.
Though they are innocent of the charges for which they were incarcerated,
there is no reason to think that they are immune from the detrimental effect
that prison has on prisoners. It is well established that prison can habituate
criminal behavior. 4 Furthermore, exonerees, like all prison releasees, face
1

See Compensation for the Wrongly Convicted, T HE INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Compensation.php (last visited M ay 23, 2013).
2
See Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U.
CHI. L. SCH . ROUNDTABLE 73, 93 (1999); Shawn Armbrust, Note, When Money Isn’t
Enough: The Case for Holistic Compensation of the Wrongfully Convicted, 41 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 157, 166 (2004); Louise Radnofsky, Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, AM.
PROSP ECT (July 24, 2007), http://prospect.org/article/compensating-wrongly-convicted.
3
See infra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
4
While no prior data has been collected regarding the effect of prison on exonerees,
abundant research shows that prison can act as a school for crime, especially for the young.
The so-called prisonization hypothesis was first articulated in DONALD CLEMMER, T HE
PRISON COMMUNITY (1940). Other seminal works include EDWARD Z AMBLE & FRANK J.
PORP ORINO , COP ING , BEHAVIOR, AND ADAP TATION IN PRISON INMATES (1988); Stanton
Wheeler, Socialization in Correctional Communities, 26 AM. SOC. REV. 697 (1961);
M atthew T. Zingraff, Prisonization as an Inhibitor of Effective Resocialization, 13
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daunting challenges reentering society. People exiting prison need, but
often do not have, physical and mental health care, education, food,
housing, jobs, and a support network. 5 In the absence of these resources,
former prisoners often return to criminal behavior. 6 Reentry problems are
especially acute for exonerees because they have spent so long in prison. In
our data set, the average time spent wrongfully incarcerated was 12.5
years. 7 Thus, there is every reason to think that exonerees may pose a
substantial risk for post-release offending. There is also every reason to
hope that compensating these victims may have an ameliorative effect.
This study is part of a larger project on the post-release behavior of
wrongfully convicted individuals. Utilizing a data set of exonerees
compiled from the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern
University, the larger study tracks the behavior of 118 exonerees following
their releases and examines the effects of more than twenty variables on the
exonerees’ post-release criminality. The variables include demographics
such as the nature of the offense for which the exoneree was wrongly
convicted, the basis for his exoneration, and whether the individual had a
criminal record prior to the wrongful conviction, among others.
We present here our findings on the effect of victim-compensation
statutes on post-exoneration offending, examining compensation as a
dichotomous variable—whether compensation is provided or not—and a
continuous variable—how much compensation is provided. When treated
as a dichotomous variable, compensation has no apparent effect.

CRIMINOLOGY 366 (1975).
The “school of crime” hypothesis is laid out in Patrick Bayer et al., Building Criminal
Capital Behind Bars: Peer Effects in Juvenile Corrections, 124 Q.J. ECON . 105 (2009). The
prevailing modern view is that longer sentences may do more harm than good. See, e.g.,
Francis T. Cullen et al., Prisons Do Not Reduce Recidivism: The High Cost of Ignoring
Science, 91 PRISON J. 48S (2011); Paul Nieuwbeerta et al., Assessing the Impact of FirstTime Imprisonment on Offenders’ Subsequent Criminal Career Development: A Matched
Samples Comparison, 25 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 227 (2009); G. M atthew Snodgrass
et al., Does the Time Cause the Crime? An Examination of the Relationship Between Time
Served and Reoffending in the Netherlands, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 1149 (2011).
5
See Cathleen Burnett, Restorative Justice and Wrongful Capital Convictions: A Simple
Proposal, 21 J. CONTEMP . CRIM. JUST. 272, 274 (2005); Armbrust, supra note 2, at 175–81.
6
See JOAN PETERSILIA , WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME : PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY
139–54 (2003).
7
Other researchers and advocacy groups report similar timelines. The Innocence Project
reports an average wrongful incarceration of thirteen years for DNA cases. See Mission
Statement, T HE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/M issionStatement.php (last visited June 4, 2013). Samuel R. Gross et al. report an average of ten
years of wrongful incarceration based on a sample of DNA and non-DNA cases. See Samuel
R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524 (2005).
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Compensated exonerees offend at roughly the same rate as those who were
not compensated. When treated as a continuous variable, however, a
pattern emerges. Exonerees who are compensated above a threshold
amount of $500,000 commit offenses at a significantly lower rate than those
who are either not compensated or compensated beneath the threshold level.
Generally, a history of prior offending is an indicator of risk of future
offending. However, among exonerees compensated above the $500,000
threshold, those with prior criminal histories offended after release at the
same rate as those with no criminal history. Remarkably, exonerees who
were compensated below the $500,000 level committed more offenses than
those who were not compensated at all, although this finding is not
statistically significant.
Taken together, these findings have profound implications for how the
federal and state governments treat exonerees and have the potential to shift
the debate, which has heretofore been premised on fairness, to more
traditional public policy grounds. Following this Introduction, this Article
offers an overview of victim-compensation laws and related scholarship on
their effects. Part III describes the larger project of which this study is a
part and details the methodology employed. Following the presentation of
results in Part IV, the Article continues by presenting two theoretical
frameworks that may help make sense of the central findings. The Article
concludes with possible avenues for future study and some suggestions for
legal reform.
II. A SURVEY OF VICTIM -COM PENSATION LAWS AND
RELATED SCHOLARSHIP
Exonerees may seek official compensation through one of three
means: tort claims, private bills, or compensation statutes. Whichever path
an exoneree goes down, he encounters substantial obstacles.
Exonerees may sue the federal government under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,8
or they may sue state governments through common law tort claims for
malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. Exonerees rarely prevail on
these claims. 9 The standards for either action are daunting. 10 Under either
8

Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
See Burnett, supra note 5, at 274 (“[T]he standards to establish constitutional violations
are so low that, with the courts’ deference to the official’s actions, it is very difficult for the
claimant to win.”); Daniel S. Kahn, Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Burden of
Proof in Wrongful Conviction Claims Under State Compensation Statutes, 44 U. M ICH . J.L.
REFORM 123, 133 (2010) (“Common law tort claims, such as malicious prosecution and false
imprisonment . . . are exceedingly difficult to maintain.”); John M artinez, Wrongful
Convictions as Rightful Takings: Protecting “Liberty-Property,” 59 HASTINGS L.J. 515, 531
(2008) (“Such claims are therefore typically unsuccessful because police can usually
9
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cause of action, demonstrating the wrongfulness of the conviction is
insufficient to substantiate the claim. 11 Rather, the exoneree must show a
violation of a specific constitutional right. This obstacle is substantial
because wrongful convictions result most commonly from erroneous
eyewitness identification, false confession, tunnel vision (an unwillingness
or inability to consider evidence contrary to an investigator or prosecutor’s
preexisting theory of the case), perjured testimony, incentivized witnesses
(such as informants or jailhouse snitches), or bad science. 12 None of these
typical errors necessarily involves a violation of constitutional rights. 13
Even more problematic is that in instances where a constitutional right has
been violated, the offending government actors are protected by absolute
immunity with respect to prosecutors and judges and by qualified immunity
with respect to police officers. 14 Absolute immunity, as its name suggests,
is unconditional. 15 Qualified immunity protects government actors from
credibly testify that they had probable cause.”).
10
See, e.g., Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[A] plaintiff claiming
false arrest must show, inter alia, that the defendant intentionally confined him without his
consent and without justification.”); Fink v. Shawangunk Conservancy, Inc., 790 N.Y.S.2d
249, 250 (App. Div. 2005) (“To succeed on a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff
must show the initiation of an action or proceeding that terminated in favor of the plaintiff,
lack of probable cause for the prior action or proceeding, malice and special injury.”).
11
See Kahn, supra note 9, at 133 (“[A]ctions for malicious prosecution and false
imprisonment both require a showing of intent on the part of the government, as well as an
absence of probable cause for the arrest.”); M artinez, supra note 9, at 532 (“[C]laims against
governmental defendants individually in their personal capacities usually fail to meet the
high standards of proof required under state and federal law, which demand that claimants
prove the defendants acted intentionally or recklessly; that defendants acted outside the
scope of their employment; or that defendants acted while under the influence of drugs or
alcohol.”).
12
See Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convictions
After a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825, 838–56 (2010); see also
Understand the Causes, T HE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
understand/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).
13
See generally Armbrust, supra note 2, at 162 nn.43–45.
14
See Burnett, supra note 5, at 274 (“[T]he legal system is set up to protect officials (and
jurisdictions) from liability in the performance of their duties.”); Kahn, supra note 9, at 133
(“[A]ctions for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment . . . are limited by the same
immunity protections as § 1983 claims.”). On the legal standards governing immunity, see
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“[G]overnment officials performing
discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”).
15
See Evan J. M andery, Qualified Immunity or Absolute Impunity? The Moral Hazards
of Extending Qualified Immunity to Lower-Level Public Officials, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL ’Y 479, 486 (1994) (explaining that absolute immunity protects judges, legislators,
prosecutors, the President, and other members of the Executive Branch from liability “within
the scope of their discretionary authority, provided that the action is one of a judicial,
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liability except where they have knowingly violated clearly established
law. 16 Thus, the exoneree cannot recover in cases where the government
has made a mistake or merely failed to exercise due care in avoiding a
mistake. Furthermore, the exoneree bears not only the burden of proof at
trial but also the burden of initiating the legal action in the first place. This
latter burden may be the most substantial. After spending years and often
decades in confinement, exonerees generally have no resources and no
lawyers. 17 The idea that any prison releasee would have the sophistication
to quickly initiate a lawsuit is fanciful.
Private bills are an alternative to tort claims, though no more hopeful
for the exoneree. A private bill is effectively a petition, generally to the
state legislature, to compensate an exoneree. 18 An exoneree pursuing a
private bill avoids the legal immunities that protect government actors, but
in many regards this is a tougher row to hoe. 19 The exoneree who wishes to
sue requires only an attorney. The exoneree pursuing a private bill requires
a lobbyist and a campaign manager. Like any political initiative, a private
bill requires vigorous advocacy and is subject to the vagaries of the political
process. 20 Some states have declared private bills unconstitutional.
Moreover, generally speaking, state legislatures are poorly equipped to deal
with the growing number of wrongful conviction petitions. On the whole,
neither private bills nor tort claims are fruitful avenues for exonerees to

legislative, or prosecutorial nature”).
16
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; Romero v. Kitsap Cnty., 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991).
17
Burnett, supra note 5, at 278 (“[F]inding a lawyer to take the case within a given time
limit could deter many individuals from returning to court who likely have pressing survival
needs upon release.”); Kahn, supra note 9, at 136 (“M eritorious claims often are defeated
due to the substantial burden facing litigants—including the costs of litigation and the
difficulty of producing evidence related to a crime that took place years ago.”); see also
Saundra D. Westervelt & Kimberly J. Cook, Framing Innocents: The Wrongly Convicted as
Victims of State Harm, 53 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 261, 270 (2010).
18
Kahn, supra note 9, at 134 (“An alternative course of compensation for a wrongfully
convicted individual is to seek a private bill from the state legislature, which can allocate
money to the individual.”).
19
Burnett, supra note 5, at 278–79 (“Private bills are a second strategy used to obtain
compensation for a wrongful conviction. In this approach, the claimant or his or her
advocate must lobby the state legislature (likely a full-time job), all the while subject to the
whims of legislative scheming.”).
20
See Kahn, supra note 9, at 134 (“Positive publicity surrounding the exoneration, the
political connections of the exoneree, and budgetary concerns all are much more likely to
determine the fate of the bill than the merits of the claim for compensation.”); Alberto B.
Lopez, $10 and a Denim Jacket? A Model Statute for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted,
36 GA . L. REV. 665, 699–700 (2002) (“[S]pecial legislation from a state legislature is likely
only available to wronged individuals with the support of those influential in the political
world of the state.”).
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pursue. 21
The best bet for an exoneree seeking compensation is through a
preexisting statute, though the picture here is also grim. Only twenty-seven
states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes to compensate the
wrongfully convicted. 22 While most of these statutes do not require an
exoneree to show government misconduct, most states place substantial
restrictions on eligibility. In some states, exonerees may not seek
compensation if they somehow contributed to their convictions (by, for
example, pleading guilty to the crime or falsely confessing). 23 In other
states, only those with official pardons from the government may seek
compensation. 24 In still others, only those who were exonerated with DNA
evidence are considered eligible. 25
Some states impose time constraints on exonerees who seek
compensation. 26 Often, these statutes of limitation are extremely short. For
example, California only allows an exoneree two years to file a claim. 27
Until recently, that period was merely six months. 28 Even where there is no
burdensome statute of limitations, the process of securing recovery is often
expensive and protracted since most statutes place the burden of proof on
the litigant, who must prove his innocence about a crime that often took

21
See Armbrust, supra note 2, at 158–59 (“Although some wrongfully convicted
individuals have received compensation through civil rights lawsuits or special bills passed
by the legislature, recovery through those methods is difficult.”). On the limitations of tort
claims and private bills, see Jessica R. Lonergan, Note, Protecting the Innocent: A Model for
Comprehensive, Individualized Compensation of the Exonerated, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL ’Y 405, 407–13 (2008).
22
See supra note 1.
23
For example, Nebraska law denies compensation to those who plead guilty or falsely
confess, unless that false confession was later found to have been coerced. NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-4603(4) (Supp. 2012).
In M assachusetts, an individual is not eligible for compensation if he pleaded guilty
(unless the plea was withdrawn, vacated, or nullified). See M ASS. ANN . LAWS ch. 258D,
§ 1(C)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); see also Armbrust, supra note 2, at 168 nn.86–88.
24
See Armbrust, supra note 2, at 168 n.89.
25
For example, in M ontana and M issouri, only wrongfully convicted persons exonerated
through DNA testing are eligible for at least certain types of compensation. M O . ANN . STAT.
§§ 650.057, 650.058 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013); M ONT. CODE ANN . § 53-1-214(1) (2011).
26
In M ississippi, an exoneree can apply within three years “after either the grant of a
pardon or the grant of judicial relief and satisfaction of other conditions described in Section
11-44-3(1).” M ISS. CODE ANN . § 11-44-9 (2012). In California, a claim “must be presented
by the claimant to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board
within a period of two years after judgment of acquittal or discharge given, or after pardon
granted, or after release from imprisonment . . . .” CAL . PENAL CODE § 4901 (West 2011).
27
Id.
28
Id.
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place many years ago. 29 These obstacles are cumulatively substantial.
Only 41% of wrongfully convicted individuals ever receive any
compensation. 30
Finally, even the exoneree who satisfies the eligibility requirement,
perseveres in his legal battle, and joins the successful 41% is not guaranteed
to recover very much. States place caps on the amount that a litigant can
recover. 31 Generally speaking, the compensation is inadequate in every
sense. 32 It is too little in comparison to the harm suffered by the exoneree,
and inadequate to help the exoneree land on his feet following release.
States vary widely in the principles they use to determine awards. 33 Some
states offer a flat-rate payment to exonerees. Others increase awards
relative to the amount of time served. It is commonly left to the court to
determine what amount fairly and reasonably compensates the individual. 34
Furthermore, several states set a ceiling on recovery. 35 In many instances,
this ceiling is absurdly low. 36 For example, New Hampshire limits
compensation to $20,000, regardless of the amount of time served. 37 A few
states provide meager support services beyond the financial award. 38
29

Kahn, supra note 9, at 125 (“[T]his approach . . . demands that the wrongfully
convicted person come forward with evidence related to the crime when it is often the state
that possesses such evidence, and it delays for years the time it takes for a wrongfully
convicted person to recover much-needed compensation.”).
30
Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 120 (2008); see also
Lopez, supra note 20, at 673 (reporting that “only 37% of wrongfully convicted persons
actually receive compensation”).
31
Kahn, supra note 9, at 142–44; see also Burnett, supra note 5, at 276; Compensation
for the Wrongly Convicted, supra note 1.
32
Lopez, supra note 20, at 673 (“[C]urrent statutory schemes grossly undercompensate
the wrongly convicted.”).
33
In California, there have been reports of exonerees being denied compensation after
spending as long as five years wrongfully convicted. See M arie C. Baca, Wrongly Convicted
Face Uphill Battle to Obtain Compensation, CAL . WATCH (M ar. 5, 2011),
http://californiawatch.org/public-safety/wrongly-convicted-face-uphill-battle-obtaincompensation-9014.
34
Id.
35
For example, in Louisiana, exonerees are eligible for $25,000 per year of wrongful
conviction. However, there is a cap of $250,000 for physical harm and injury suffered by
the exoneree. LA . REV. STAT. ANN . § 15:572.8(H)(2) (2012). In Iowa, the statute allows for
$50 per day of wrongful imprisonment. Iowa also provides attorneys’ fees in some cases
and lost wages up to $25,000 a year. See IOWA CODE ANN . § 663A.1 (West 1998). In
Wisconsin, regardless of number of years wrongfully incarcerated, the maximum total lump
sum is $25,000. WIS. STAT. ANN . § 775.05 (West 2009).
36
On the wide variation in damage payments, see Armbrust, supra note 2, at 169 nn.98–
104 and accompanying text; Lonergan, supra note 21, at 411–12.
37
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN . § 541-B:14(II) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2012).
38
Even the states that take the progressive step of providing medical care to exonerees
require a showing that their health conditions are directly related to the erroneous
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In response to the inadequacy of compensation, the American Bar
Association (ABA) and the Innocence Project, among other organizations,
have promulgated model reform legislation to increase awards to
exonerees. 39 These proposals retain the adversarial process as a framework
for determining compensation, but attempt to estimate more realistically the
damages actually suffered by the exoneree. For example, the ABA
proposal includes compensation for pain and suffering, and for lost pay
while incarcerated. 40 In contrast to all current legislation, which dictates
limits on the amount an exoneree may receive, the Innocence Project model
statute establishes a minimum of $50,000 per year incarcerated, with an
additional $50,000 per year served on death row. 41 These proposals for
legislative reform also attempt to deal more realistically with the challenges
faced by exonerees upon reentering society. They call for the government
to provide, or cover the cost of, physical and psychological services. The
Innocence Project’s model legislation recommends lifelong physical and
mental health care provided through the state employees’ health-care
system if the exoneree’s employer does not already provide health care. 42
This attempt to address the needs of former prisoners reentering society is
particularly significant since, as will be discussed below, exonerees often
receive less in the way of reentry services than typical releasees or
parolees. 43
The academic community, too, has condemned the deficiencies of
wrongful compensation statutes and offered various suggestions for reform.
convictions. See, e.g., M ASS. ANN . LAWS ch. 258D, § 5(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013)
(requiring the state to “address any deficiencies in the individual’s physical and emotional
condition that are shown to be directly related to the individual’s erroneous felony
conviction and resulting incarceration”).
39
See AM. BAR ASS’N , SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE , REP ORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES (2005), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/
criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_policy_my05108a.authcheckdam.pdf;
T HE
INNOCENCE PROJECT, M ODEL LEGISLATION , 2011 STATE LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS: AN ACT
CONCERNING CLAIMS FOR WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND IMP RISONMENT (2010), available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/2011/modelbills/Compensation_M odel_Bill_
2011.pdf.
40
AM. BAR ASS’N , supra note 39, at 1.
41
T HE INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 39, § 4B.
42
See id. § 4B(2).
43
See Burnett, supra note 5, at 273 (“Ironically, wrongfully convicted persons are not
eligible for [state-sponsored support or reentry programs] and so have fewer resources
available to them to resume their lives than those who have rightfully served their prison
time.”); CAL . COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN . OF JUSTICE , FINAL REP ORT 115 (Gerald Uelmen
& Chris Boscia eds., 2008), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinal
Report.pdf (“Ironically, even the limited resources made available to the convicted felons
who have served their sentences and are released from prison are not available to those
whose convictions have been set aside.”).
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A leading voice, Adele Bernhard, has argued in favor of lifting “antiquated
restrictions” on recovery and increasing potential awards. 44 Daniel S. Kahn
has proposed shifting the burden of proof to the state to prove that a
claimant is guilty, as opposed to requiring an exoneree to demonstrate his
innocence. 45 Alberto Lopez has proposed a rival model statute. 46 These
scholars follow in the footsteps of Yale’s Edwin Borchard, who in 1932
condemned the failure to compensate the wrongfully convicted as a national
shame. 47
Many of these critics of the status quo have drawn attention to the
inadequacy of money to redress the physical, psychological, and financial
issues that confront exonerees upon their reentry to society. Shawn
Armbrust argues for “holistic” compensation—“a combination of financial
compensation, job training services, and medical care.” 48 Cathleen Burnett
proposes to apply the restorative justice model and create comprehensive
individualized plans to reintegrate the wrongfully convicted into society. 49
Lopez’s model statute includes compensation for noneconomic harms. 50
Almost uniformly, these cries for reform by advocacy groups and
scholars have been predicated on appeals to fairness. 51 This is true both
44

Bernhard, supra note 2, at 74.
See Kahn, supra note 9, at 148–57.
46
See Lopez, supra note 20.
47
EDWIN M . BORCHARD , CONVICTING T HE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE , at
xiii (1932).
48
Armbrust, supra note 2, at 160 n.29.
49
See Burnett, supra note 5, at 280.
50
Lopez, supra note 20, at 716.
51
See, e.g., Stuart Beresford, Commentary, Redressing the Wrongs of the International
Justice System: Compensation for Persons Erroneously Detained, Prosecuted, or Convicted
by the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 628, 633 (2002) (“[T]he international
community has a moral obligation to compensate an individual for losses incurred as a result
of the application of its coercive powers.”); Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of
Recent Efforts to Compensate Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later
Exonerated, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 703, 708 (2004) (“M ost importantly, a legislative remedy is
the only reliable and fair response to the inevitable mistakes that occur as a byproduct of the
operation of a criminal justice system as large as ours.”); Bernhard, supra note 2, at 74 (“The
state whose actions have put individuals in prison for crimes they did not commit owes a
debt to those who through no fault of their own have lost years and opportunity.”);
Lonergan, supra note 21, at 452 (“[W]hile the state has no legal duty to compensate
exonerees, it has a profound moral obligation to do so. Justice demands restitution for those
whom the legal system—whether by mistake or malice—wrongfully incarcerates.”);
M artinez, supra note 9, at 537 (“[F]reedom alone is not enough for the person who has been
chewed up by the criminal justice system and then spit out as wrongfully convicted, lacking
compensation for the harm suffered.”); Teressa E. Ravenell, Cause and Conviction: The
Role of Causation in § 1983 Wrongful Conviction Claims, 81 T EMP . L. REV. 689, 691 (2008)
(“Although wrongful convictions may be an inevitable consequence of our criminal justice
system, it would seem that a person wrongly deprived of his liberty is entitled to a civil
45
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with respect to the strand of scholarship that calls for increased financial
awards and for those who argue that monetary compensation is inadequate.
Armbrust, for example, invokes traditional retributive language in
defending the need for nonmonetary compensation. 52 In the tradition of
restorative justice, Burnett rejects identifying and punishing the offender—
here the state—in favor of identifying the needs of the victim. Ultimately,
though, her claim is also premised on a sense that the community bears a
“responsibility” to the exoneree. 53
Indeed, the fairness argument is substantial. Wrongfully convicted
individuals are victims in the truest sense. They have done nothing to bring
about the harm they have suffered. In a retributive sense, they deserve
compensation, inadequate though it may be. Perhaps because the fairness
argument is so convincing, little attention has been paid to the social
benefits that flow from compensating the wrongfully convicted. Only a
handful of scholars have focused on the potential usefulness of
compensation statutes. Joseph King, one of the earliest advocates of
compensation statutes, defended them in part as a means of reducing
errors. 54 Following King’s lead, others, including one of the authors of this
Article, have defended compensation statutes under law and economics
principles. 55 In the area of torts, law and economics generally favors

remedy to compensate for the mistakes of the criminal system.”); Joseph H. King, Jr.,
Comment, Compensation of Persons Erroneously Confined by the State, 118 U. PA . L. REV.
1091, 1092 (1970) (arguing that “when the exercise of state power results in an erroneous
confinement, the government whose police power made such confinement possible should to
the extent feasible redress the victim’s injury, regardless of whether any government agent
has played a culpable role”). One notable exception is Khan, supra note 9, at 124 (“Yet it is
now quite clear, if it was not before, that wrongfully convicted persons require
compensation, not just for lost wages and the pain and suffering endured while incarcerated,
but also for the substantial obstacles they face when they attempt to reenter and regain their
life after prison.”).
52
See Armbrust, supra note 2, at 160 (“Although it is not clear whether the state has a
legal obligation to compensate the wrongfully convicted, there certainly is a moral obligation
to do so. The wrongfully convicted clearly have suffered an injustice at the hands of the
state and many others, and the state is in the best position to provide meaningful
compensation . . . .”).
53
Burnett, supra note 5, at 280–81 (“Immediately, the victim’s needs are the primary
concern and the community recognizes its responsibility for helping with restoration,
focusing on reintegration.”).
54
See generally King, supra note 51.
55
See Evan J. M andery, Commentary: Efficiency Considerations of Compensating the
Wrongfully Convicted, 41 CRIM. L. BULL . 287 (2005); John J. Johnston, Comment,
Reasonover v. Washington: Toward a Just Treatment of the Wrongly Convicted in Missouri,
68 UM KC L. REV. 411 (2000). But see Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Thoughts on Damages
for Wrongful Convictions, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 127 (2010).
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placing liability on the cheapest cost avoider. 56 With respect to wrongful
convictions, the government is in a far better position than defendants to
avoid wrongful convictions. 57 Placing liability on the government would
create an incentive—which currently does not exist—for prosecutors to
avoid wrongful convictions. 58
Wholly absent from the literature are study and argument regarding the
impact that compensation statutes have on the post-release behavior of the
exonerated. This is an efficiency argument that is different in kind from the
concern with reducing wrongful convictions.
It is possible that
compensation statutes can be defended solely because they enable
exonerees to lead productive lives or help them avoid leading unproductive
lives. No scholar has examined the post-release behavior of exonerees.
This dearth of research and commentary may be philosophical—as
noted above, the fairness argument is compelling—but is more likely
practical. The universe of exonerees is small, and post-release behavior is
difficult and expensive to track. While the authors believe that fairness
requires compensating the wrongfully convicted, we hope to move the
conversation beyond the philosophical. Our study of post-exoneration
offending suggests that the positive consequences that flow from
compensating the wrongfully convicted may be a sufficient justification for
more and better compensation statutes.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. THE LARGER PROJECT

The current study is part of a larger project on post-exoneration
offending, which seeks to examine the post-release offending behavior of
wrongfully convicted individuals and the risk they pose. The exonerees’
legal histories were obtained through the Center on Wrongful Convictions
(CWC) at the Bluhm Legal Clinic at Northwestern University School of
Law. We restricted our focus to individuals released between 1999 and
2009 because complete criminal record information is only available from
1999 onward, and with respect to the end date, to allow at least three years
for adequate follow-up. The data set was compiled from exonerations from
56
Johnston, supra note 55, at 414 (arguing that compensation is appropriate “to shift the
risks of ‘accident’ to the party better suited to handle them”) (emphasis added).
57
See M andery, supra note 55, at 287 (“Wrongfully convicted individuals are victims in
the truest sense. . . . M ost tort victims contribute in some way to their own injury. . . . [T]he
wrongfully convicted are often guilty of nothing other than being themselves—of being in
the wrong place in the wrong time, or of bearing a resemblance to a wrongdoer.”).
58
M andery extends the incentive argument to call for prosecutors and jurors to pay, at
least in part, for wrongful convictions in which they played a role. Id. at 298–301.
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four states: Illinois, Florida, New York, and Texas. 59 Inclusion criteria for
CWC exoneration cases include: cases in which a sentence was long
enough to be reviewed on appeal, cases that have been reviewed, and cases
that have available exculpatory evidence. 60 The current study also included
cases that do not involve DNA. Furthermore, seventeen of the cases from
Texas derived from a single mass exoneration in Tulia, Texas. 61 These
cases form a distinct subset because they were not individualized
exonerations.
We obtained post-exoneration offending data through background
checks provided by Maximum Reports, Inc., a commercial data supplier.
Maximum Reports, like all commercial data suppliers, requires an
“identifier”—typically a date of birth or social security number. CWC case
histories included such an identifier in approximately one-third of the cases.
In thirteen cases, an exoneree had returned to prison and the identifier was
obtainable from the state correctional department. For the remaining cases,
we conducted independent searches. 62 We excluded all cases for which we
failed to find an identifier. Thus, the number of cases included in the study

59

Cost limitations restricted us to performing criminal history searches in only four
states. We selected the four leading exoneration states for which criminal history data is
publicly available. The top seven states in order are Illinois, New York, Texas, California,
Louisiana, M assachusetts, and Florida. See Gross et al., supra note 7, at 541. Criminal
history data from California, Louisiana, and M assachusetts is not publicly available, and thus
Florida was included in the sample. It so happens that Illinois, New York, Texas, and
Florida each has a compensation statute. As we note below in our discussion of limitations
and directions for future research, it would be interesting to compare post-exoneration
behavior among exonerees in states with and without compensation statutes. This research
will be challenging, though, as exonerations are heavily concentrated in states with
compensation statutes. M ore than 40% of exonerations occur in the top four states, and the
top ten states account for more than two-thirds of American exonerations. See id. at 541.
60
E-mail from Robert L. Warden, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Wrongful Convictions, to Amy
Shlosberg, Assistant Professor, Farleigh Dickinson Univ. (Feb. 25, 2013, 11:56 AM ) (on file
with the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology).
61
Dates of birth or other identifying information were not available for the other Tulia
exonerees. Inclusion of the Tulia cases does not affect our findings with respect to the effect
of compensation. Although we chose to include the Tulia exonerees, other researchers have
made a different choice. See Gross et al., supra note 7, at 535 (“We do not include them
here because the processes that produced the false convictions and the mass exonerations in
these singular episodes are fundamentally different from those in the individual cases on
which we focus . . . .”).
62
We used several different sources to obtain these records, including sex offender
registries, attorney contacts, recorded court decisions, Westlaw, LexisNexis, social media
websites, and general Internet search engines. Finding identifiers is the distinctive challenge
of this research. For current prisoners, the identifiers are generally available from state
correctional departments. For all but the thirteen individuals who had returned to prison for
a new offense, this was not a viable option.
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was substantially smaller than the pool provided by the CWC. 63 The final
set included 118 exoneration cases. These included thirty-one exoneration
cases from Illinois, seventeen from Florida, twenty-four from New York,
and forty-six from Texas.
Each exoneration history at the Bluhm Legal Clinic contains specific
information regarding the exoneration, including a case chronology, legal
citations, and original case materials. This allows for the evaluation of
various aspects of the exoneration and their potential link to postexoneration offending. All of the included cases were coded for the
following independent variables: sex, age at time of arrest, age at time of
release, race, number and nature of prior offenses (if any), nature of the
offense that brought about the erroneous conviction, factors that led to the
erroneous conviction (false eyewitness testimony, false confession, etc.),
evidence (DNA or non-DNA), expungement status (whether there is any
evidence of the wrongful conviction on record), the procedural posture of
the exoneration (e.g., executive pardon), and compensation.
The dependent variable, post-exoneration offending, was measured
dichotomously (yes or no) and continuously (number of offenses).
Unfortunately, some states only publicize reconviction and resentencing
data, omitting rearrest data, an important variable in recidivism research.
Our study used only reconviction as an indicator of post-exoneration
offending. In addition to the number of post-exoneration offenses, we also
measured the amount of time between release and recidivism and the type
of post-exoneration offense.
B. THE COMPENSATION STUDY

The final independent variable, compensation, is our focus here. From
the data gathered from CWC, compensation information was provided for
about one-third of the sample. Thus, Internet and LexisNexis searches were
conducted to obtain the missing information. All four states included in this
study have compensation statutes. 64 Compensation was coded both as a
63

CWC had records of 196 known exonerations in Florida, Illinois, New York, and
Texas between 1999 and 2009. This included forty-four cases in Illinois, nineteen cases in
Florida, forty-nine cases in New York, and eighty-four cases in Texas. If a case identifier
was located, that case was included in the study.
64
In Florida, a wrongfully convicted individual found innocent by a prosecuting
authority or administrative court judge is entitled to $50,000 (adjusted for cost-of-living
increases) annually, up to a maximum of $2 million, as long as he has no prior felony
convictions. FLA . STAT. ANN . §§ 961.04, 961.06 (West 2012). He is also entitled to 120
hours of tuition at a career center, community college, or state university, and reimbursement
for any fines or costs imposed at the time of his sentence. Id. § 961.06. These statutes were
effective as of 2008. Id. In Illinois, exonerees who have been granted a pardon by the
Governor or a certificate of innocence by the circuit court are eligible for the following
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dichotomous variable (whether the exoneree received it or not) and on a
continuous scale (how much he received if he received any) to test the
association between amount of compensation and post-exoneration
offending. Where compensation was awarded, the compensation amount
ranged from $100 to $18.5 million. Since there was such variation in
compensation, a cutoff point of $500,000 was established. We calculated
this number by removing the cases that received no compensation and then
finding the median point of the remaining cases. Using this cutoff point, we
also created a trinary ordinal variable for highly compensated ($500,000
and greater), minimally compensated (less than $500,000), and not
compensated.
At the bivariate level, chi square tests were used to determine if there
was a statistically significant relationship between post-exoneration
offending and the dichotomous compensation variable. Furthermore, t-tests
were used to test whether there was a significant difference between postexoneration offending and how much (in dollars) was received. We used
ANOVA tests to determine whether there was a mean difference in number
of post-exoneration offenses by compensation type (none, less than
compensation: $85,350 for those who served up to five years, $170,000 for those who served
between five and fourteen years, and $199,150 for those who served more than fourteen
years. 705 ILL . COMP . STAT. ANN . 505/8(c) (West 2007 & Supp. 2013). The law also
reimburses attorneys’ fees up to 25% of the compensation award and provides job search
services, placement services, and reentry services. Id.; 20 ILL . COMP . STAT. ANN . 1015/2
(West Supp. 2013). The New York statute, which was made effective in 1984 and amended
in 2007, provides that if the wrongfully convicted person “did not by his own conduct cause
or bring about his conviction” and files a claim within two years of his pardon of innocence,
he shall receive “damages in such sum of money as the court determines will fairly and
reasonably compensate him.” N.Y. JUD . CT. ACTS LAW § 8-b4, -b6 (M cKinney 1989 &
Supp. 2013). The statute allows the Court of Claims to award any amount—there is no floor
or ceiling. Id. § 8-b6. In Texas, the 2009 Tim Cole Act (named after Timothy Cole, the
recipient of the state’s first posthumous pardon) established the Timothy Cole Advisory
Panel on Wrongful Convictions. H.B. 498, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009), available at
http://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth148951/m1/1/.
Whereas payments to
exonerees previously had been a lump sum, the Tim Cole Act dictates that compensation be
paid out in a mix of monthly payments with an up-front lump sum and an annuity that can be
passed on through a recipient’s estate. T EX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN . §§ 103.052,
103.053 (West 2011). Additionally, the Act states that a wrongfully convicted person is
entitled to $80,000 per year of wrongful incarceration and $25,000 per year spent on parole
or as a registered sex offender. Id. § 103.052. The wrongfully convicted person is also
entitled to compensation for child support payments, tuition for up to 120 hours at a career
center or public institution of higher learning, reentry and reintegration services, and the
opportunity to buy into the Texas State Employee Health Plan. Id. §§ 103.052, 103.054.
This statute, originally enacted in 2001, was amended in 2011 to include a provision
precluding payments to anyone who served time for a wrongful conviction at the same time
he was serving out a legitimate sentence for which he would have been in prison anyway.
Id. § 103.001 (West Supp. 2012).
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$500,000, or $500,000 or more). We tested the effect of compensation
above the threshold amount on the risk of future offending. We stratified
the relative risk of post-release offending of those with and without a prior
history of offending. Lastly, we regressed compensation, age at release,
and prior convictions against post-exoneration offending.
IV. RESULTS
A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table 1 presents simple descriptive statistics. Sixty-seven (56.8%) of
the exonerees in our sample were black, thirty-four (28.8%) were white, and
fourteen (11.9%) were Hispanic. The remaining two exonerees were coded
as “other.” All but five of the exonerees were male, and the average
exoneree was approximately twenty-seven years old at time of arrest, with
ages ranging from twelve to sixty-seven. The average age at release was
thirty-nine. The youngest releasee was nineteen. The oldest was sixty-two.
More than one-third of the exonerees included in this sample were from
Texas (n = 46), a quarter were from Illinois (n = 31), about 20% were from
New York (n = 24), and the remaining 14% (n = 17) were from Florida.
Sixty-seven (56.8%) of the exonerees were convicted of at least one
crime prior to the crime for which they were wrongfully convicted. Fifty
(42.4%) exonerees in our sample had no prior record. The average number
of prior convictions across the sample was just under two. Among those
with prior convictions, the average number of those convictions was 2.9.
Seventy-four (62.7%) of the exonerees were sentenced to a finite custodial
or prison term. Twenty-two (18.6%) were sentenced to life without parole
(LWOP). Seventeen (14.4%) were sentenced to death, four (3.4%) received
a noncustodial sentence, and one case was missing from the analysis.
Consistent with prior research, the average exoneree in our sample spent
more than eleven years in prison, as measured from the date of conviction
to the date of release. 65 The maximum term of incarceration was almost
twenty-seven years. Almost half of our sample (49.2%) was comprised of
non-DNA exoneration cases. This is uncommon among the limited prior
research on exonerees.

65

See Gross et al., supra note 7, at 524 (reporting an “average of more than ten years
each [for the wrongfully incarcerated]”). The Innocence Project reports an average of 13.5
years behind bars for the wrongfully convicted. See Compensating the Wrongly Convicted,
T HE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Compensating_The_
Wrongly_Convicted.php (last visited M ay 24, 2013).
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Table 1
Descriptives of Sample Characteristics
M

SD

26.8
39.1

7.9
9.9

1.7

2.4

2.9

2.5

PEOs (Across S ample)

.98

1.8

PEOs (Among Those with
PEOs)

2.5

1.9

11.2

7.1

Gender
M ale
Female
Race
African-American
White
Hispanic
Other
S tate
Florida
Illinois
New York
Texas
Age at Arrest (Mean)
Age at Release
Prior Conviction(s)
No
Yes
Number of Prior Convictions
(Across S ample)
Number of Prior Convictions
(Among Those with Priors)
S entence
LWOP
Death
Finite Custodial
Noncustodial
Post-Exoneration Offense
(PEO)?
No
Yes

DNA Exoneration
No
Yes
Time Incarcerated (Mean in
Years)

n

%

113
5

95.8
4.2

67
34
14
2

56.8
28.8
11.9
1.9

17
31
24
46

14.4
26.3
20.3
39.0

50
67

42.4
56.8

22
17
74
4

18.6
14.4
62.7
3.4

73
45

61.9
38.1

58
60

49.2
50.8
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B. POST-EXONERATION OFFENDING

Table 2 presents data on post-exoneration offending. Forty-five
(38.1%) of the exonerees in our sample were convicted of at least one crime
after they were released. Seventy-three members (61.9%) of the cohort did
not offend post-exoneration. Rates of offending varied by state. Florida
has the highest rate of post-exoneration offending, at 58.8%. New York
had the lowest rate (8.3%). Individual state compensation statutes may
offer a partial explanation. Florida’s statute is extremely restrictive. In
Florida, an individual with a prior felony conviction is not eligible for
compensation, and compensation is capped at $50,000 annually. 66 New
York, by contrast, has no ceiling on compensation. 67 The explanatory
power of the statutes is substantially limited, though, and we present the
variation here only by way of description. Although as noted above, it is
difficult to prevail under the alternative methods of lawsuit and private bill,
those who succeed generally receive much more substantial awards than
those who are compensated by statute.
Table 2
Post-Exoneration Offending by State
State (n)

Yes (% )

No (% )

Texas (46)
Illinois (31)
New York (24)
Florida (17)
Total (118)

21 (45.7%)
12 (38.7%)
2 (8.3%)
10 (58.8%)
45 (38.1%)

25 (54.3%)
19 (61.3%)
22 (91.7%)
7 (41.2%)
73 (61.9%)

We coded post-exoneration offenses (PEOs) as violent (aggravated
assault, battery, involuntary manslaughter, or child abuse), property-related
(burglary, theft, larceny, breaking and entering and shoplifting, or drugrelated), or other (gambling, probation violation, giving false information,
driving without a license, resisting arrest, interfering with an emergency
call, obstruction of justice, reckless conduct, or an equipment violation).
Among the forty-five exonerees who offended following their releases,
twenty committed a violent offense, thirteen committed a property crime,
twenty committed a drug offense, and sixteen committed an offense
classified as “other.” Note that several of the exonerees committed more
than one offense.
66

In Florida, an exoneree is entitled to $50,000 annually with a maximum award of $2
million. FLA . STAT. ANN . § 961.06.
67
New York’s compensation statute has a provision that allows the Court of Claims to
award any amount. There is no floor or ceiling. N.Y. JUD . CT. ACTS LAW § 8-b6.
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C. COMPENSATION

Overall, seventy-one exonerees (60.2%) in our sample received
compensation. This is higher than the compensation level of 41% found by
Garrett. 68 Our figure may be inflated due to the inclusion of cases
stemming from the mass exoneration in Tulia, Texas. 69 Forty-five
individuals (38.1%) had not received compensation at the time of coding.
This includes those seven cases in which compensation is pending (5.9%).
In two cases, it was not possible to determine whether the exoneree had
been compensated or not.
The avenue that successful exonerees used to receive compensation
was determinable in approximately 73% of cases (n = 52). As Table 3
displays, a majority of the exonerees whose mode of compensation was
determinable received funds through state compensation statutes. Among
the remaining compensated exonerees, sixteen successfully filed and won a
civil suit and six were compensated as the result of a private bill.
Table 3
Mode of Compensation
Mode of Compensation

n

%

State Statute

30

57.6

Civil Suit

16

30.7

Private Bill

6

11.5

When exonerees did receive compensation, the amount varied greatly.
The least amount of compensation received was $100, while the largest
reward was $18.5 million. Of the 111 cases in which the amount of

68
See Garrett, supra note 30, at 120. As noted above, our sample was constructed from
states with compensation statutes.
69
The Tulia cases ended with a series of executive pardons and, in M arch 2004, a
settlement of a federal civil rights claim for $5 million. Adam Liptak, $5 Million Settlement
Ends Case of Tainted Texas Sting, N.Y. T IMES, M ar. 11, 2004, at A14. For the wrongfully
convicted defendants, who had spent a cumulative seventy-one years in prison, this
amounted to a little more than $84,500 per year. See Rob Warden, Town of Tulia: Texas
“Officer of the Year” Chalked up 38 Wrongful Convictions, CTR. ON WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictions/
exonerations/tx/town-of-tulia.html (last visited M ay 24, 2013). Although, as noted above,
see supra note 61, inclusion of the Tulia cases does not affect our findings regarding the
effect of compensation; the Tulia exonerees generally had more prior convictions and
offenses following their releases than the other members of the sample. Thirteen of the
seventeen Tulia exonerees included in the sample had prior offenses. Twelve committed a
PEO.
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compensation could be determined,70 approximately half received less than
$100,000 (or nothing) and more than 70% received less than $500,000.
Only 29% of the exonerees received compensation in excess of $500,000.
Table 4
Amount of Compensation
Compensation Amount
$0

n
45

%
40.5

Cumulative %
40.5

> $0 ≤ $100k
> $100k ≤ $500k

13
21

11.7
18.9

52.3
71.2

> $500k ≤ $1mil
> $1mil ≤ $10mil

1
29

0.9
26.1

72.0
98.2

> $10 mil

2

1.8

100.0

Table 5 displays the bivariate relationship between post-exoneration
offending and compensation. Although not statistically significant when
examining compensation dichotomously, those exonerees who received
compensation were less likely to commit a post-exoneration offense (63.4%
did not reoffend). The mean amount of compensation for those with no
post-exoneration offense was $1.7 million, as compared to $720,000 for
those who had at least one post-exoneration offense. This suggests that
compensation has a positive effect on exonerees; the more they are
compensated, the less likely they are to offend after exoneration.
A significant finding emerges when we distinguish between those who
were compensated less than $500,000 and those who received more than
$500,000 (p < .01). As the table displays, those who received more than
$500,000 were less likely to offend after exoneration (we interchangeably
refer to this as “success”). Among this higher compensation group, more
than 80% succeeded. There is an even split among those who received less
than $500,000 (50% had a PEO; 50% did not). Individuals in this group
were no less likely to offend. 71
70

In four cases, the amount of compensation could not be determined.
Once compensation emerged as significant, we compared the profiles of the
compensated exonerees and the uncompensated exonerees. In general they are quite similar.
Among those who were compensated (n = 71), sixty-eight (95.8%) were males and three
(4.2%) were female. Among those who were not compensated (n = 45), forty-three (95.6%)
were male and two (4.4%) were female. For those compensated, the average age at arrest
was 27.5 years, the average age at release was 40.2, and the average number of years
between conviction and release was 11.5. For those uncompensated, the average age at
arrest was 25.8, the average age at release was 38.0, and the average number of years
between conviction and release was 11.0. Of the compensated, fifty-seven (80.3%) were
71
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Table 5
Bivariate Analysis of PEO by Compensation (Binary and Trinary)
% (n)

Success
(no PEO)
62.9% (n = 73)

Failure (PEO)
37.1% (n = 43)

Compensation+
No
38.8% (n=45)
62.2%
37.8%
Yes
61.2% (n=71)
63.4%
36.6%
Compensation* ++
Nothing
38.8% (n=45)
60.0%
40.0%
Under $500K
29.3% (n=34)
50.0%
50.0%
$500K or more
28.4% (n=33)
81.8%
18.2%
Mean
$1,700,000
$720,000
Compensation**
*Significant at .01 level
**Significant at .05 level
+
There were 2 cases with unknown compensation statuses.
++
The exact amount of compensation is unknown for four cases. For the
purposes of comparison between compensation categories, we used 116 for the
denominator for the compensation figures.

As Table 6 reflects, there was a statistically significant difference
between groups as determined by one-way ANOVA (F (2, 64.55) = 3.088,
p = .05). The variances of the groups were not similar and thus we referred
to the Robust Tests of Equality of Means Table instead of the ANOVA
Table (displayed below). Tukey post-hoc tests revealed that the number of
post-exoneration offenses was statistically significantly lower for those who
received $500,000 or more in compensation (.45) compared to those who
received less than $500,000 (1.58). There were no statistically significant
differences between those who received no compensation (.84) and those
who received any amount of compensation. These findings suggest that
compensation can potentially decrease not only the likelihood but also the
frequency of post-release offending. This relationship is strongest when the
compensation exceeds $500,000.

nonwhite and thirteen (18.3%) were white. Among the uncompensated, twenty-five (55.6%)
were nonwhite and twenty (44.4%) were white. The mean date of release for both groups
was 2002. Seventy percent of the compensated exonerees were released in 2004 or earlier.
Sixty-two percent of the uncompensated exonerees were released in 2004 or earlier.
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Table 6
Analysis of Variance
Welch

Statistic

df

df2

Sig

3.088

2

64.759

.05*

*Significant at .05 level

When compensation is greater than $500,000, there is a substantial
reduction in the relative risk (RR) of post-release offending among those
with a prior history of offending. The overall RR is reduced from 1.65 to
.442 for those with a history of prior offending. More importantly, there is
no difference in the RR of exonerees with a history of prior offending
(.442) and those without (.441). A RR of less than 1 indicates a decreased
likelihood of post-release offending among those who received
compensation at a threshold amount. The reduction of risk confirms the
ANOVA results. Compensation above a threshold amount decreases the
likelihood of post-release offending and suggests that compensation is an
important protective factor against post-release offending. Due to small cell
values, we are cautious in relying on these findings.
Table 7 presents a multivariate model regressing compensation, age at
release, and prior convictions against the binary outcome of postexoneration offending. Age at release and prior offending are widely
recognized as the most significant predictors of post-release offending. 72
Moreover, it is plausible to imagine an interrelationship here among age at
release, prior offending, and compensation. 73 The full model containing all
72

Of course, all of the available research concerns recidivism as opposed to post-release
offending. The two most significant predictors of recidivism are prior record and age at
release. See ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIP LEY , BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP ’T OF JUSTICE , RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983, at 2–3 (1989); PATRICK A.
LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN , BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE ,
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 7–10 (2002); Daniel S. Nagin et al.,
Imprisonment and Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115, 137 (2009); Daniel S. Nagin &
Raymond Paternoster, On the Relationship of Past to Future Participation in Delinquency,
29 CRIMINOLOGY 163, 165 (1991). Other significant predictive factors include institution
type, length of imprisonment, and certain characteristics of the offender. See, e.g., Nagin et
al., supra, at 137. In our study, time served and age at release were highly correlated
(R = 62), and including both variables in the model did not explain additional variance in
post-release offending.
73
The data on compensation and prior offending is not normally distributed. Both the
variables for the amount of compensation and the number of prior convictions have a large
number of zeros. Thirty-seven of the exonerees received no compensation and thirty-eight
had no prior convictions. We tried a number of transformations to compensate for these
skews, including logs and various dichotomizations. An interaction term was created
combining prior convictions and compensation. The addition of this variable did not change
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predictors was statistically significant χ²(4) = 21.320, p = .000. The model
as a whole explained between 18.2% (Cox and Snell pseudo R2 ) and 25.0%
(Nagelkerke pseudo R2 ) of the variance in post-exoneration offending. Age
was not a significant predictor of post-exoneration offending. However, the
number of prior convictions was significant (Exp β = 1.393). We included
an interaction term combining prior convictions and compensation, but the
addition of this variable did not significantly improve the model. Including
race in the model also did not explain additional variance. 74
Compensation in modest amounts (between zero and $500,000) made
no significant difference on post-exoneration offending behavior. However,
generous compensation (greater than $500,000) had a significant protective
effect (p = .039). Because both the variables for the number of prior
convictions and the amount of compensation have a high proportion of
zeros, we view examining risk ratios, as in Table 5 supra, as more
appropriate. 75
Table 7
Logistic Regression Analysis: Post-Exoneration Offending by
Compensation, Age at Release, and Prior Convictions
0 < Compensation < 500K
Compensation > 500k

B
.499
-1.298

SE
.509
.629

Wald
.962
4.262

Exp(B)
1.647
.273*

Age at Release (in Days)
Number of Prior Convictions

.000
.331

.000
.116

2.397
8.106

1.000
1.393***

Constant
.491
.960
.190
Model Summary
Model χ² = 20.200***; -2LL = 105.754
Nagelkerke pseudo R² = .260; Cox & Snell pseudo R² = .190
n = 96
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

1.520

the model. Ultimately, we settled on dummy variables for $500,000 and above, and for less
than $500,000 but more than 0; none is used as the reference category. These categories fit
the data the best and produced the best logistic regression.
74
While including race did not explain additional variance, compensation—which
previously failed to reach significance in a one-tailed test—emerged as significant at the .05
level.
75
For those exonerees who offended post-release (n = 45), we used Cox regression to
determine whether age at release, length of incarceration, and compensation amount were
related to the length of time until their offenses (interchangeably referred to as “failure”).
Among these individuals, the median time to failure was twenty-seven months with a range
between fourteen days and ten years. The mean time to failure was thirty-five months with a
standard deviation of thirty-one months. Age at release, days wrongfully convicted, and
compensation amount were included as covariates in the hazard model. None of these
predictors, or the model itself, emerged as significant.
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V. DISCUSSION
Our principal finding, that compensation above $500,000 significantly
reduces post-exoneration offending but compensation below that threshold
has no significant effect, is consistent with two theoretical perspectives.
The first is a wealth of literature on the barriers to successful reentry, which
are substantial for all prison releasees and overwhelming for exonerees
because they have been incarcerated for so long. It may be that a certain
minimum amount of money—and that minimum would be substantial—is
necessary for an exoneree to get his life on track. The second perspective is
research suggesting that perceptions of systemic procedural fairness affect
criminal conduct. It may be that exonerees who receive substantial
compensation feel fairly treated by the system and thus offend less often.
We discuss these perspectives serially, though they are neither mutually
exclusive nor exclusive of other potential explanations.
A. BARRIERS TO SUCCESSFUL REENTRY

All former prisoners face a substantial challenge reentering society.
The majority of prison inmates will eventually be released and returned to
communities. 76 Most will return to prison within three years of their
releases. 77 Releasees return home with most of their needs unmet and many
lose essential rights of citizenship. 78 Additionally, there are barriers to
employment. 79 Research shows that employment is critical to successful
reintegration 80 and is among the strongest predictors of desistance from
76

The U.S. Department of Justice estimates that nearly 95% of prison inmates will
eventually be released. For example, in 2002, approximately 595,000 inmates were released
to communities. See T IMOTHY HUGHES & DORIS JAMES WILSON , BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE , REENTRY T RENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2002).
77
Approximately two-thirds (62.5%) of released prisoners are rearrested for a new crime
within three years of release, 47% are convicted of a new crime, and 41% are sent back to
prison or jail. See BECK & SHIP LEY , supra note 72, at 5. These statistics were updated in
2002. Approximately 68% of releasees are rearrested for a new offense (almost exclusively
a felony or a serious misdemeanor), 47% are convicted of a new crime, 25% are sentenced to
prison for a new crime, and 52% are returned to prison either under a new sentence or for
technical violations of their releases. See LANGAN & LEVIN , supra note 72, at 1.
78
See PETERSILIA , supra note 6, at 105 (“[C]onvicted felons may lose many essential
rights of citizenship, such as the right to vote and to hold public office . . . . Their criminal
record may also preclude their receiving government benefits and retaining parental
rights . . . and nearly always limits firearm ownership. The restrictions on employment and
housing create formidable obstacles to law-abidingness.”).
79
Id. at 113 (“[E]mployers are increasingly forbidden from hiring [ex-offenders] for
certain jobs . . . child care, education, security, nursing, and home health care . . . .”).
80
See Shawn Bushway & Peter Reuter, Labor Markets and Crime, in CRIME : PUBLIC
POLICIES FOR CRIME CONTROL 191 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2004)
(reviewing the relationship between employment and reoffending); M ark W. Lipsey, What
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crime. 81 When returning home, releasees also lack support networks. This,
too, can lead them to turn to crime. 82 Some post-release offending may be
attributable to the effect that prison has on inmates. The interruption of
normal personal and professional development and the time spent in a
hostile environment can lead to “prisonization.” This refers to an
individual’s adaptation to the prison environment, which may include
adoption of criminal values, techniques, and subcultures. 83 Prisonization
may lead to post-release offending. 84
Although exonerees are not criminals in any sense, they face the same
obstacles as ordinary releasees. In fact, there is every reason to believe that
the exonerees’ experiences may be worse. With respect to prisonization,
exonerees are at special risk. Some evidence suggests that a convict’s
length of imprisonment is positively related to his likelihood of
recidivism. 85 Furthermore, exonerees’ experiences may be worse than
those of guilty inmates. 86 Not-guilty inmates employ a number of different
coping strategies to survive prison. 87 While some passively cooperate with
prison officials, others maintain their innocence in the face of unfavorable
responses from parole boards and prison administrators, who interpret their
“denials” as a lack of responsibility, an indication of dangerousness, or
unwillingness to reform. As a result, prison administrators are less likely to
recommend the innocent inmate for privileges. 88 Given this, exonerees
Do We Learn from 400 Research Studies on the Effectiveness of Treatment with Juvenile
Delinquents?, in WHAT WORKS: REDUCING REOFFENDING —GUIDELINES FROM RESEARCH
AND P RACTICE 63, 74–76 (James M cGuire ed., 1995) (describing a meta-analysis suggesting
employment to be an effective measure in reducing recidivism); Christopher Uggen, Work as
a Turning Point in the Life Course of Criminals: A Duration Model of Age, Employment,
and Recidivism, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 529, 529–30 (2000).
81
Devah Pager, Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime, and Getting a Job, 2005 WIS. L. REV.
617, 647.
82
The Urban Institute Returning Home study found that strong family support reduced
recidivism. See Families and Reentry, URB. INST., http://www.urban.org/projects/reentryportfolio/families.cfm (last visited June 4, 2013).
83
See Nagin et al., supra note 72, at 126–27.
84
Although there is no research on exonerees and post-release offending, research has
established a strong link between prior incarceration and future offending. This relationship
can be explained by prisonization or exposure to an inmate subculture. For a review of this
topic, see id.
85
See id. at 169–77 for a review of the literature.
86
Kathryn Campbell & M yriam Denov, The Burden of Innocence: Coping with a
Wrongful Imprisonment, 46 CAN . J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 139, 152–53 (2004).
87
See generally id.
88
On the other hand, maintaining one’s innocence also helps exonerees reject the label
that society and the criminal justice system have ascribed to them. See id. at 150–52.
Perhaps by rejecting this label exonerees are less likely to internalize criminal norms and
subcultures, leading them to commit fewer crimes upon their releases.
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would apparently have the most compelling claims on state resources to
assist their reentries to society.
Yet, ironically, exonerees often have access to fewer resources and
state support programs after release than they would if they had actually
committed a crime. 89 Exonerees may not qualify for ex-offender services
because they are technically not ex-offenders or parolees. 90 Thus,
exonerees cannot take advantage of prerelease counseling, job training,
substance abuse treatment, and housing assistance, and have no go-to
person, as parolees commonly do. 91 Typically, released exonerees receive
no more than “clothing for the day, a bus ticket, and what is called ‘gate
money.’” 92 Gate money generally ranges from $10 to $150. 93 With this in
pocket, they attempt to reenter society and find employment, although they
have years missing from their resumes and, in many cases, a criminal record
that has not been expunged. 94 What little research that has been conducted
on the experience of exonerees reveals, surprisingly, that the overwhelming
majority need jobs. A study of sixty exonerees conducted by the Life After
Exoneration Program showed that two-thirds had not achieved financial
independence. 95 People leaving prison, generally speaking, are “typically
among Americans with the most dire housing needs.” 96 One exoneree said:
It just didn’t seem fair that you take 18 years of a person’s life and you think you can
send them out into the world and everything’s going to be all right because now they
have their freedom? Yeah, freedom is very important but you also have to have a lot
97
of different things set up for people . . . .

These needs have been impliedly recognized, albeit in piecemeal and
inadequate fashion, by individual states in their compensation statutes. For
example, Vermont and Virginia provide funding for transition assistance—
money to carry the exoneree through from his release to his final award. 98
89

See Burnett, supra note 5, at 274.
See Armbrust, supra note 2, at 161.
91
Janet Roberts & Elizabeth Stanton, A Long Road Back After Exoneration, and Justice
Is Slow to Make Amends, N.Y. T IMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at 38.
92
See Burnett, supra note 5, at 273.
93
See Campbell & Denov, supra note 86, at 150–53.
94
See Amy Shlosberg et al., The Expungement Myth, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1229 (2012).
95
Over 500 Exonerees: A Number that Keeps Growing Every Month, LIFE AFTER
EXONERATION PROGRAM, http://www.exonerated.org/index.php?option=com_content&view
=article&id=94&Itemid=87 (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).
96
Corinne A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal Records Denied Access
to Public Housing, 36 U. T OL . L. REV. 545, 552 (2005).
97
ILL . CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO . AUTH ., T HE NEEDS OF THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED : A
REP ORT ON A PANEL DISCUSSION 2 (2002), available at http://www.icjia.state.il.us/public/
pdf/ResearchReports/Needs.pdf.
98
VT. STAT. ANN . tit. 13, § 5574(b)(3) (2009); VA . CODE ANN . § 8.01-195.11(C) (2007
90
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A few state statutes offer physical and medical health care. 99 A handful
provide for education assistance. 100 The Innocence Project and the ABA
provide for some components of holistic compensation in their legislative
proposals. 101
Given these facts, our finding that substantial compensation reduces
post-exoneration offending makes intuitive sense. Those who do not need
to worry about paying rent, feeding their families, and meeting basic needs
have overcome the most substantial barriers to reentry and will be less
likely to resort to crime. It takes a lot of money to achieve these ends,
particularly because these needs endure in perpetuity. Exonerees require
food and shelter and medical care for years, not days. It makes perfect
sense that it takes hundreds of thousands of dollars for them to establish
lives where their risk of offending resembles that of ordinary citizens.
B. PERCEPTIONS OF PROCEDURA L FAIRNESS

In Why People Obey the Law, Tom Tyler argues that, in most
instances, people do not conform to the law because they are deterred by the
consequences of breaking it. 102
Rather, most people, under most
circumstances, follow the law because they respect it, because they view the
institutions that uphold the law as legitimate, and because they feel
respected and valued by it.
This theory has its roots in Thibaut and Walker’s control theory, which
demonstrated that people are generally satisfied with an outcome, regardless
of what that outcome is, if they regard the process that generated that
outcome as fair. 103 Results affect perception, but procedural fairness has a
greater impact on satisfaction. Thibaut and Walker’s particular theory of
procedural fairness, however, still depends heavily on outcomes. They
argue that while people generally do not focus on outcomes, they do focus
on the degree to which they influence the decisionmaking process, under
the assumption that more influence gives them a greater likelihood of
& Supp. 2012).
99
See Lonergan, supra note 21, at 147.
100
LA . REV. STAT. ANN . § 15:572.8(H)(2)(c) (2012); M ASS. ANN . LAWS ch. 258D, § 5(A)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2013); M ONT. CODE ANN . § 53-1-214 (2011); VA . CODE ANN . § 8.01195.11(C).
101
See AM. BAR. ASS’N , supra note 39, at 1 (“The award should include non-economic
losses, such as pain and suffering, humiliation, loss of consortium, and loss of
reputation . . . .”); T HE INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 39, at 4–5 (proposing a consideration
of economic damages, noneconomic damages, physical and mental health, tuition, and
attorneys’ fees).
102
T OM R. T YLER, WHY PEOP LE OBEY THE LAW (2006).
103
JOHN T HIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE : A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1975).
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success.
Drawing on this work, Lind and Tyler formulated the “group value
theory” of procedural justice. 104 While the group value theory recognizes
that people are invested in procedural fairness for its “instrumental” value,
they also judge institutions and processes based on factors that do not affect
outcomes. For example, even if people know that having a “voice” will not
affect the outcome, they still prefer processes that give them one. 105
Likewise, they are concerned with “interpersonal aspects” of the process,
such as whether they were treated politely and with respect 106 and whether
or not the authority was motivated to be fair,107 even if such factors do not
affect outcomes. According to this theory, people perceive the way they are
procedurally treated by a group or authority as a reflection of how much
they are valued by the group or authority, and fair procedures are good for
more than procuring fair results. The theory suggests, for example, that if
one prisoner was convicted via fair means and another inmate was
convicted via unfair procedures, such as coercive police tactics, the former
will feel more valued and respected by the criminal justice system even if
they both received the same sentence. These process evaluations, along
with the degree to which the inmates feel respected as human beings, in
turn influence the inmates’ generalized judgments regarding the fairness
and legitimacy of the criminal justice system and their relation to it.
Critically, these differences in evaluations affect behavior. The prisoner
who regards his sentence as having been fairly produced is more likely to
follow the law in the future. 108
Compensation can ameliorate perceptions of unfairness. In a series of
laboratory studies, Tyler Okimoto had undergraduate participants imagine
or experience procedurally unfair situations and then manipulated whether
the victim of the injustice received compensation. 109 He also varied the
relevance of the participants’ group membership and the stated intent of the
compensation to determine whether compensation was viewed in relational
104
E. ALLAN LIND & T OM R. T YLER, T HE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
230 (1988).
105
See Tom R. Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring
the Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL . 72, 79–80 (1985).
106
See T YLER, supra note 102, at 164.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 178 (“People obey the law because they believe that it is proper to do so, they
react to their experiences by evaluating their justice or injustice, and in evaluating the justice
of their experiences, they consider factors unrelated to outcome, such as whether they have
had a chance to state their case and been treated with dignity and respect.”).
109
Tyler G. Okimoto, Outcomes as Affirmation of Membership Value: Material
Compensation as an Administrative Response to Procedural Injustice, 44 J. EXP ERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL . 1270 (2008).
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or merely instrumental terms. 110 Not surprisingly, those who received
compensation viewed the procedural justice of the scenario more favorably
than those who did not receive compensation. Furthermore, they viewed
compensation as a symbolic gesture that reflected positively on their
standing within the group. 111
Taken together, this research offers a second viable explanation for the
link between compensation and offending: procedural fairness is a central
problem with respect to exonerees, as wrongful convictions are often
accompanied by unfair procedures. In some cases, the very people who are
responsible for ensuring truth and justice—law enforcement officials and
prosecutors—lose sight of these obligations and instead focus solely on
securing convictions. 112
DNA exonerations have exposed official
misconduct at every level and stage of a criminal investigation. 113 In
exonerees’ accounts of the criminal justice system, procedural unfairness is
a recurring theme. 114 Upon release, exonerees generally exhibit “profound
cynicism and mistrust regarding the fairness and legitimacy of authority
figures.” 115
Qualitative research supports the potential ameliorative effect of
compensation in this context. A cohort of Canadian exonerees interviewed

110

See id. at 1280. In one condition, an authority figure who commits a procedural
injustice is described as a senior student and teaching assistant from either the participant’s
school or a competing school. According to group value theory, the procedural injustice
should only be interpreted in relational terms if it is committed by a member of one’s social
group, and compensation should only be interpreted as an attempt at recompense under such
circumstances. True to the theory, compensation only made a significant impact when it was
offered by the authority figure from the student’s own institution.
111
See id. (“[T]he benevolent act of compensating shows the injustice victim that he or
she is a valued and respected group member, verifying the importance of that victim’s
membership in the group.”).
112
See
Government
Misconduct,
T HE
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Government-M isconduct.php (last visited Apr.
14, 2013).
113
Id. Common forms of misconduct by law enforcement officials include: employing
suggestion when conducting identification procedures, coercing false confessions, lying or
intentionally misleading jurors about their observations, failing to turn over exculpatory
evidence to prosecutors, and providing incentives to secure unreliable evidence from
informants. Common forms of misconduct by prosecutors include: withholding exculpatory
evidence from the defense; deliberately mishandling, mistreating, or destroying evidence;
allowing witnesses they know or should know are not truthful to testify; pressuring defense
witnesses not to testify; relying on fraudulent forensic experts; and making misleading
arguments that overstate the probative value of testimony.
114
See generally Adrian Grounds, Psychological Consequences of Wrongful Conviction
and Imprisonment, 46 CAN . J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 165 (2004).
115
See Campbell & Denov, supra note 86, at 155.
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by Campbell and Denov placed substantial importance on compensation. 116
They viewed its “symbolic” value as greater than its “actual” value. 117
While the Canadian exonerees acknowledged that money helped them meet
practical needs, this seemed less important to them than seeing the
responsible parties take ownership of their actions and admit their mistakes
or wrongdoing. Commonly, they sought a formal apology or, at least, an
admission of responsibility from the government, suggesting that the
exonerees care deeply about restoring their status as valued group
members. 118
This is consistent with Okimoto’s observation that
compensation’s symbolic value derives from what it communicates to
exonerees about their standing in the group. The Okimoto study did not
measure behavior, but when it is combined with Tyler’s findings on the
relationship between perceived legitimacy and compliance, it does suggest a
possible progression from wrongful conviction to perceived procedural
injustice to the use of compensation to improve these perceptions to, finally,
decreased law-breaking, depending on how much compensation is received.
If compensated exonerees feel more valued than uncompensated
exonerees, it stands to reason that highly compensated exonerees would feel
more valued than minimally compensated exonerees, and that these restored
perceptions of social value and institutional legitimacy will foster increased
compliance with the law. Given the difficulties of securing compensation
in the United States, it stands to reason that a minimally compensated
exoneree would feel unvalued. And given that this population is comprised
of people who have experienced the most profound unfairness, it makes
intuitive sense that only substantial compensation can restore an exoneree’s
sense of value.
More research is needed to confirm this hypothesis. Qualitative
research, along the lines of Campbell and Denov, would be especially
useful to see whether the experience of the American exoneree is consistent
with his Canadian counterpart. Our research has a notable limitation.
Compensation is not part of a social experiment. The exonerees we studied
were not randomly assigned to either receive or not receive compensation.
As noted, the road to compensation is a long and difficult one, and probably
only the most dedicated exonerees ever succeed. This fact introduces a
selection bias because certain individuals’ willpower, determination, and
ability to sacrifice short-term gains for long-term ones may be responsible
for both their receiving compensation and their abstention from crime.

116
117
118

Id.
Id.
Id.

2013]

COMPENSATION STATUTES

583

VI. CONCLUSION
The fairness argument for compensating wrongfully convicted
individuals is substantial. Our research suggests that the public policy
reasons for compensation are compelling, too. These results can only be
taken as tentative given the size of the data set. As we note, this is a
consequence of the challenges of obtaining identifying information for
exonerees. 119 Among other things, it would be interesting to see whether
exonerees act differently following release in states without compensation
statutes. We also see substantial potential value in qualitative research that
endeavors to understand the real-world forces that lead some exonerees to
offend following their releases. Despite these open questions, it is clear that
substantial compensation may considerably reduce post-release offending.
Theory suggests that this is because compensation helps exonerees
overcome the substantial barriers to reentry that they face and because it
makes them feel valued by society. This perception of being treated
procedurally fairly may contribute to desistance.
The phrase “substantial compensation” bears emphasis. Our research
suggests that insubstantial compensation is of little benefit. This is
consistent with the same theoretical perspectives.
Insubstantial
compensation neither enables the exoneree to reenter society successfully
nor leaves him feeling valued by the criminal justice system. Given how
difficult it is to secure compensation, a trivial award may only add insult to
injury. These findings suggest that compensation is only a mitigating factor
when the amount exceeds $500,000. Many states provide a cap on
compensation that is much lower than this amount. 120 Of course, even
trivial compensation costs money, so the current situation in the United
States is the worst of all possible worlds.

119
120

See supra note 62.
See, e.g., supra note 35.
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